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concern of the Noerr Court with the right to petition is of little im-
portance. Furthermore, Hecht properly evaluated and applied the
criteria used by the Supreme Court in Silver to determine that the
congressional intent expressed in the Stadium Act did not preempt
that of the antitrust laws. The rationale of the Hecht court has con-
siderable merit and should provide the basis for further distinctions
in the area of antitrust immunity.
FREDERICK J. DEANGELIS
Administrative Law—Reviewability of Final Orders under the
FIFRA—Limits on Administrative Discretion—Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus. 1 —In October, 1969, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. (EDF) and other public interest organiza-
tions representing ecological priorities petitioned the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture 2
 under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)a to issue notices of cancellation for
the registrations of all products containing DDT and to suspend
immediately those registrations because of the imminent hazard posed
to the public health by widespread use of DDT 4 . The Secretary issued
notices of cancellation for four uses of DDT,5
 but he deferred his
decision on the remaining uses pending a preliminary study of the
matter. He took no action on the request for suspension.
In December, 1969, the petitioner sought review of the Secre-
tary's action in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.° The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
1
 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2
 The functions of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act have been transferred to the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency. 5 U.S.C. App. § 2(8)(i) (1970).
3
 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970).
4
 The statutory grant of authority contained in the FIFRA gives the Administrator
considerable discretion to determine whether the registration of an economic poison
should be immediately suspended. The Administrator may order suspension when he
determines that a pesticide does not conform with a provision in the FIFRA or when
he finds that such action is necessary to prevent an imminent hazard to the public. The
Administrator must give the affected party notice of such action and, if the party is a
registrant, must afford him the "opportunity to have the matter submitted to an advisory
committee and for an expedited hearing." The suspension procedure maintains the status
quo and allows the registrant to submit evidence refuting any claim that the pesticide
presents a danger to the public health. 7 U.S.C. 135b(c)(1970).
5
 34 Fed. Reg. 18827 (1969). The cancellation notices directly affected the following
uses of DDT:
(a) all uses on shade trees, including elm trees, for control of the elm bark
beetle which transmits the Dutch elm disease;
(b) all uses on tobacco;
(c) all uses in or around the home except limited uses for control of disease
vectors, as determined by public health officials;
(d) all uses in aquatic environments, marshes, wetlands and adjacent areas,
except those which are essential for the control of disease vectors, as deter-
mined by public health officials.
0 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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alleging, inter alia, that he had not made a reviewable final order . and
that petitioner lacked standing to sue.' The court ruled that the Secre-
tary's silence with respect to the request for suspension constituted a
final order because it was tantamount to a denial of that request and
effectively disposed of further consideration of the question of interim
relief.° Since it was arguable whether the Secretary's delay in issuing
the remaining notices of cancellation amounted to a refusal to act, the
court determined that further evidence of administrative inaction
would have to be shown before it would find the necessary degree of
ripeness for judicial review.° The court remanded the case to the
Secretary for a decision as to whether suspension and the issuance of
cancellation notices for the remaining uses of DDT were warranted,
and for a detailed statement of reasons for his decision. 1° On remand,
the Secretary decided not to suspend the DDT registrations. His de-
cision not to suspend was accompanied by the statement that "scien-
tific evidence . . . does not establish that the use of DDT constitutes
an imminent hazard to human health.' The Secretary also concluded
that further action on cancellation would have to await the outcome
of departmental evaluation of the remaining uses of DDT.' 2
In the principal case the petitioners sought review of the Secre-
tary's decision not to suspend and, by way of mandamus, 18
 sought to
7
 Id. at 1096. The court had little difficulty in granting standing to EDF in light
of both the legislative history of the FIFRA and recent Supreme Court decisions which
have examined the concept of standing as a constitutional prerequisite for jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution. The court found that the public interest in safety
compels standing under the FIFRA. Furthermore, the court cited numerous cases which
have expanded the concept of standing to include those parties who litigate in the
public interest and, particularly, those parties whose interest falls within the zone of
interests sought to be protected by the statute. See Association of Data Processing Service
Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970). The EDP court concluded that "they [EDF, Sierra Club et at) are
organizations with a demonstrated interest in protecting the environment from pesticide
pollution. Therefore they have the necessary stake in the outcome of a challenge to the
Secretary's inaction to contest the issues with the adverseness required by Article III of
the Constitution." 428 F.2d at 1097.
8 Id. at 1099.
0 Id. at 1100.
10 Id.
11
 In discussing the effects of DDT on human health and the environment, the
Secretary made the following observations:
We know of no reported injury to any human as a result of the use of DDT
in accordance with directions. Human injury has occurred only in instances of
accidental and deliberate exposure to inordinately heavy dosages. . • A review
of animal populations shows no overall decline but, to the contrary, the harvests
of fish and wildlife populations are continually increasing.
Statement of the Reasons Underlying the Decisions On Behalf of the Secretary With
Respect to the Registration of Products Containing DDT, 3-4, filed on June 29, 1970
(D.C. Cir.).
12 The Director of Science and Education, Department of Agriculture, stated that
"the Department is presently conducting a thorough, active evaluation with respect to
-each use of every registered product that contains DDT." Id. at 8.
13
 Under this type of proceeding the court could order the Secretary to issue notices
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compel the Secretary to issue notices of cancellation for the remaining
uses of DDT. The petitioners alleged, in effect, that the Secretary's
continued evaluation of DDT was unwarranted after he had deter-
mined that the pesticide's use raised a substantial question of public
safety.' The court HELD: (1) an order denying suspension is
sufficiently final in its impact to warrant judicial review under the
FIFRA;" (2) the Secretary is obliged to initiate the statutory proce-
dure which might result in cancellation once he has determined that
a substantial question as to the safety of DDT exists;" and (3) the
Secretary's decision not to suspend must be accompanied by an ade-
quate statement of reasons.'' The court remanded the case to the
Secretary and directed him to issue a statement setting forth the
reasons for his decision not to suspend." The Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, who assumed the duties of the
Secretary of Agriculture under the FIFRA" subsequently issued
those reasons," and reaffirmed the decision not to suspend.' The
principal issues raised by the decision are (1) whether the EDF court
correctly interpreted the FIFRA and relevant case law in concluding
that a denial of a request for suspension constitutes a final reviewable
order and (2) whether the court's requirement of reasons from the
Secretary unduly circumscribed administrative discretion.
The EDF court viewed the question of finality for purposes of
review under the FIFRA 22 in terms of the' impact of the Secretary's
of cancellation if it determined that such issuance constituted a statutory duty of the
Secretary under the FIFRA.
14 439 F.2d at 592-93.
15
 Id. at 592.
10
 Id. at 595.
17 Id. at 596-98.
I° Id. at 596.
1° See note 2 supra. Hereinafter the words "Secretary" and "Administrator" wilt
be used interchangeably.
20 In support of his position not to suspend, the Administrator indicated that in
the future the following considerations will be weighed in deciding whether a pesticide
presents an imminent hazard to the public: "(1) The nature and magnitude of the for-
seeable hazards associated with use of a particular product. . . . (2) Concurrently, the
nature of the benefit conferred by use of a given product must be weighed . . . . After
applying the foregoing analysis . . . this agency has determined that no suspension of
such [DDT] products is warranted . . . ." Reasons Underlying the Registration Deci-
sions Concerning Products Containing DDT, 2, 4, 5-T, Aldrin and Dieldrin at 10-12, filed
by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (March 18, 1971) (D.C.
Cir.).
21 Petitioners have sought review of this ruling, appeal docketed, No. 71-1365, D.C.
Cir., Aug. 2, 1971.
22 The appropriate sections of the FIFRA dealing with judicial review are 	 135b(c)
and (d). Subsection (c) states that "[f]inal orders of the Administrator under this sec-
tion shall be subject to judicial review, in accordance with the provisions of subsection
(d). . . ." Subsection (d) provides, in relevant part, that:
In a case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order under this
section, any person who will be adversely affected by such order may obtain
judicial review . . . in the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein
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order upon the parties. The court determined that the • concept of
finality includes broader considerations than whether an order is
the "last" order in an administrative adjudication." Thus, the court
rejected the argument that the availability of additional administrative
procedures under the statute is determinative of the test of finality
for purposes of review." The irreparable public injury alleged by
EDF as a result of the imminent hazard posed by DDT was con-
sidered by the court a deprivation of rights sufficient to warrant the
requested judicial intervention."
The EDF court's emphasis on "immediacy of impact" as the
criterion for granting judicial review was in conflict with another
recent decision upon which the Secretary had relied. In Nor-Am
Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin,' a case decided by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Secretary had suspended the registration
of Panogen, a mercury compound manufactured by Nor-Am. 2T The
court determined that the statutory provisions granting judicial review
of the Secretary's decision were quite explicit and that the "flexibility
of the finality concept does not .. . permit facile disregard of the
purposes of Congressional delegation of power and of the clear pro-
cedural scheme delineated in the particular statute" Because the
provisions in the FIFRA dealing with suspension precede those dealing
with the registrant's right to petition for the public hearing and for the
appointment of a scientific advisory committee, the court concluded
that the statutory scheme indicated a clear congressional intent to
withhold judicial review of suspension orders until remaining adminis-
trative proceedings have been exhausted." The EDF court, however,
such person resides or has his principal place of business, or in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit . . . •
7 U.S.C. § 1356(c), (d) (1970).
25 439 F.2d at 591.
24
 Id. at 589-590 n.8.
28 The EDF court explained its rationale in the following terms:
The test of finality for purposes of review is not whether the order is the last
administrative order contemplated by the statutory scheme, but rather whether
it imposes an obligation or denies a right with consequences sufficient to war-
rant review. . . alhe denial of a suspension order must be reviewable as a
final order where, as here, the moving papers before the court support the
allegation that the denial subjects the public to an imminent hazard and that
any injury is irreparable.
Id.
28 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970),
27
 Suspension of Panogen followed soon after a nationally publicized incident in-
volving the fatal ingestion by three children of pork from hogs which had been fed
with Panogen-treated hog seed. In letters to Nor-Am, the Secretary explained that the
decision to suspend was made "to prevent an imminent hazard to the public . . ." and
that "to allow new stocks to enter channels of trade would increase the risk of injury
to man and other vertebrate animals." Id. at 1153.
28 Id. at 1157-58.
28
 Id. at 1157. The statutory scheme is set out in § 1356(c) of the FIFRA. This
section provides, in part, that:
The Administrator, in accordance with the procedures specified herein, may
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made the important distinction that the correctness of the Nor-Am
conclusion depends upon the identity of the parties involved."
It is submitted that the courts must distinguish the status of the
parties seeking review in resolving the question whether judicial review
should defer to further administrative process. A judicial examination
of the parties may demonstrate that the interest of the administrative
agency in establishing a record undisturbed by judicial intervention
preempts the need of a party such as the manufacturer-registrant in
Nor-Am to obtain immediate interlocutory relief. However, in a situa-
tion such as that in EDF, where irreparable harm to the public in-
terest is alleged, the resolution of the rights in controversy demands
that the judiciary not defer to further administrative hearings. The
EDF court rejected the contention advanced in Nor-Am that an order
granting suspension is not a final reviewable order, while one denying
suspension may be, for the reason that a denial effectively cuts off
further administrative proceedings, 3 ' The Nor-Am court stated that
in the latter instance the only recourse available to the aggrieved
party may be to seek judicial review. It is submitted that such a
distinction is irrelevant, for, as EDF indicates, the FIFRA makes no
differentiation between the granting or the denial of suspension orders
as far as the availability of further administrative relief is con-
cerned." Under both sets of circumstances, a party should be able to
secure judicial review, provided he can demonstrate that the impact of
the decision will cause irreparable harm. Moreover, in dicta, the EDF
court stated that any suspension order of the Secretary is reviewable
in a "proper case." 83 In fact, the EDF court implied that it would
have granted review of the order denied judicial consideration in
Nor-Am as long as the parties demonstrated the requisite harm."
These distinctions illustrate the differing rationales of EDF and
Nor-Am as regards the question of finality. Underlying the Nor-Am
court's interpretation of the FIFRA is a concern for the efficient func-
tioning of the administrative process. The court preferred to withhold
review on the theory that premature judicial intervention without
the benefit of an extensive administrative record would unduly inter-
fere with agency autonomy. This approach is consistent with the
court's finding, stated above, that an order issued pursuant to the
suspend or cancel the registration of an economic poison whenever it does not
appear that the article or its labeling of other material required to be sub-
mitted complies with the provisions of section 135 to 135k of this title . . . . A
cancellation of registration shall be effective thirty days after service of . .
notice unless within such time the registrant (1) makes the necessary correc-
tions; (2) files a petition requesting that the matter be referred to an advisory
committee; or (3) files objections and requests a public hearing.
7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970).
38 439 F.2d at 591.
al 435 F.2d at 1157, 1159.
32 439 F.2d at 591.




FIFRA is final and ripe for review only at the completion of the
administrative process. The emphasis in EDF, however, was to protect
the interests of the parties seeking review. The dispositive considera-
tion for the EDF court was not whether there exists a prospect of
further administrative proceedings, but whether the impact of the
agency decision is final in its effect on the parties. The court's rationale
was that once the decision not to suspend had been made, the issue
of whether DDT poses an imminent hazard was effectively determined.
It should be noted that the impact rationale presupposes that review
will be granted only when the data supporting a party's allegations
evidences a harm which can satisfy the statutory standard of an
"imminent hazard.""
The conflict between the two rationales is reflected in numerous
cases which antedate the principal case. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
FPC,3° a case involving a Federal Power Commission decision to sus-
pend a rate schedule, the court faced a dilemma similar to that in EDF
and Nor-Am. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide
whether to review the Commission's suspension determination even
though it did not necessarily represent the last order on the matter.
Deciding in favor of review, the court applied a test based upon the
consideration of whether the order "finally determines the legal rights
of the parties."'" It appears that the Phillips court utilized the same
type of "impact" standard subsequently articulated in EDF. Indeed,
the Phillips court commented that the "legal consequences which attach
to these orders have conclusive effect upon the rights and duties of
Phillips."88 More specifically, the court recognized that while the
Commission's order freezing the rates would be subject to administra-
tive change at a later date, the order nevertheless "purports to establish
with finality the rates which Phillips was authorized to charge" during
the suspension period. Thus, under the approach utilized in Phillips
and EDF, review should arise upon the making of any administrative
decision which has a final effect upon one's rights.
The majority in Nor-Am cited Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc.° to support its rationale of judicial deference to administrative
activities. Ewing also involved unilateral action by an agency, that
is, immediate action without a prior hearing provided to the disadvan-
taged party. It is submitted, however, that this case was misapplied by
88 Id. at 589-590 n.8.
88 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955). The Federal Power Commission had ordered all
independent producers of natural gas to set forth in a schedule the rates they would
charge for the transportation and sale of natural gas. Pursuant to this order, Phillips
filed the requested rate schedule with the Commission. The Commission, however, de-
termined that the schedule was "unjust, unreasonable and otherwise unlawful" and
immediately suspended it. The suspension had the effect of preventing Phillips from
including in its rates charges which it felt reflected costs of production. Id. at 472-73.
37 Id. at 474.
88 Id. at 475.
89 Id.
40 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
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the Nor-Am court. In Ewing, the Supreme Court reviewed an appeal
of a probable cause finding made by the Administrator of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that the petitioner's products were
illegally misbranded. Under the Act, such a finding would allow the
immediate seizure of the misbranded articles prior to the filing of a
formal suit by the Attorney General." The Supreme Court ruled that
the district court" had erred in reviewing the probable cause finding,
even though the seizures could have a serious impact on the peti-
tioner's business." The Court reasoned that review at such a prelimi-
nary stage would destroy the effectiveness of the Act's seizure pro-
visions."
Although Ewing seems to support the Nor-Am view, a closer
analysis reveals that the Nor-Am court ignored a consideration
crucial to the holding in Ewing. Ultimately, the Ewing Court withheld
review because the probable cause finding had no binding legal
consequence by itself, but was merely a statutory prerequisite
to a formal suit to be filed at the discretion of the Attorney General:"
Thus, while the probable cause hearing for which review was sought
had finally determined that probable cause existed as to the illegal
misbranding of petitioner's products, the finding did not have any
legal effect under the Act until after the institution of the aforemen-
tioned suit. In contrast, however, in EDF and Nor-Am the effect of a
suspension determination upon the parties was not conditioned upon
the happening of a later event; rather, the action presented for review
produced immediate and serious consequences for the parties, whether
to the economic interests of a manufacturer in Nor-Am, or to the
public health in EDF. Therefore, the necessary degree of ripeness for
judicial intervention which the Court had found to be lacking in
Ewing was present in both EDF and Nor-Am.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner," a more recent Supreme Court
case, distinguished Ewing on the hereinabove mentioned ground and,
more importantly, expanded the doctrines of reviewability and finality.
In Abbott the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
promulgated a ruling which required manufacturers of prescription
drugs to include on the labels of their products not only the familiar
trade name but also the Department of HEW "established name" for
each drug. The petitioner, a drug company, sought review of the
statutory authority for this regulation, prior to its enforcement by
HEW. Thus, "pre-enforcement" review of an agency regulation was
the principal question presented to the Court." Abbott reaffirmed the
view that finality must be interpreted in a "pragmatic" way, that is,
41 Id. at 599.
42 87 F. Stapp. 650 (D.D.C. 1949).
43 339 U.S. at 600.
44 Id. at 598-99, 601-02.
45 Id. at 598.
46 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
47 Id. at 138-39.
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in terms of the impact the agency action has on the affected party."
Moreover, the Court stated that "only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts
restrict access to judicial review.' Because the language in the
FIFRA does not make clear whether review was meant to be abso-
lutely precluded until completion of the administrative process, and
in light of the pragmatic interpretation given to the concept of finality
by Abbott, it is submitted that the rationale of EDF is more appro-
priate than that of Nor-Am in deciding when review of a suspension
decision should be granted.
Although the foregoing discussion suggests that judicial review
of orders to suspend products should be easily obtained, a different
question regarding reviewability arises where the Administrator
has discretion to decide whether to issue notices of cancellation. There
exists dispute as to whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)"
permits judicial review of agency action "committed to agency dis-
cretion."" Professor Davis has interpreted the words "committed to"
as meaning "unreviewable" discretion."' Opponents of this view rely
upon the legislative history" of this section to support the position
48
 Id, at 149.
48 Id. at 141, quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1961).
8° 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (1970). Section 706 provides, in part that "Mlle
reviewing Court shall—
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law."
81 Section 701 of the APA states that "(a) [Mils chapter applies, according to the
provision thereof, except to the extent that—
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
For a full discussion of this subject, see Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional
Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 367 (1968); Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 Yale L.J. 965 (1969); 4 K. Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law Treatise § 28.16 (Sum). 1970).
82 Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness—A Postscript, 114 U. Pa, L. Rev. 823, 825
(1966). Davis supports this interpretation by noting that it "will carry out the probable
intent" of the legislators who enacted it, and that it "will produce some substantial re-
sults." Id. at 825. The cases which are in accord with the Davis interpretation are dis-
cussed in 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28.16 (Supp. 1970). But see
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 402 U.S. 401 (1971), decided after
EDF, where the Supreme Court ruled that, based on the legislative history of the
provision, "committed to agency discretion" must be viewed as a narrow exception to the
general presumption of reviewability under the APA. Only where "statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply" is review of a discre-
tionary decision precluded. Id. at 410. See discussion at pp. 417-18 infra.
83 See, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1946). Raoul Berger
'
 one such
opponent, cites a statement of Senator McCarran, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, who explained the meaning of the section in an article 'published
shortly after the enactment of 'the' APA. McCarran stated that agency action committed
by law to the discretion of the agency means "of course, that claimed discretion must
have been intentionally given to the agency by Congress, rather than assumed by it. . . .
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that "committed to" means merely that discretion has been "granted"
to the particular agency and not that the courts are thereby precluded
from reviewing any exercise of agency discretion. The EDF court
adopted the latter approach.
The court also cited the recently decided case of Mulloy
United States" to support its decision to grant review. In Mulloy,
petitioner had presented to his draft board new evidence which
justified a reopening of his 1-A classification. However, the draft board
arbitrarily refused to reconsider his classification, thus precluding
his right to further administrative appeal and judicial review. Although
the Selective Service regulations give the local boards discretion to
decide whether to reopen a registrant's classification," the Court held
that where a prima facie case for reclassification has been made, a
board cannot deprive the registrant of a statutorily guaranteed right
to review. Furthermore, the Court held that such refusal amounts to
a reviewable abuse of discretion." Mulloy suggests that there are
certain limits within which even seemingly unlimited discretion must
be restricted by the reviewing court. EDF applied the same rationale
with respect to the Secretary's decision to conduct his own evaluation
of the remaining uses of DDT rather than to issue immediately notices
of cancellation of their registration. The EDF court reasoned that
although the FIFRA authorizes the Secretary to issue cancellation
notices at his discretion," his continued delay in issuing notices after
finding a substantial question as to the safety of DDT constituted a
reviewable abuse of discretion." EDF found support for its decision
in a report of the House Committee on Government Operations
reviewing the administration of the FIFRA." The Committee em-
phasized that in deciding whether a cancellation action was warranted
"a mistaken belief that positive evidence of hazard rather than simply
a lack of adequate assurance of safety . . . appears to have been a
factor in the failure to initiate such action in cases where it was ob-
viously justified." 00
 The court concluded that the Secretary's State-
ment of Reasons, which had indicated "that the uses of DDT should be
`[A]buse of discretion' is expressly made reviewable." McCarran, Improving "Administra-
tive Justice": Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827, 831
(1946) cited in Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 Yale L.J. 965, 977
(1965).
54
 398 U.S. 410 (1970).
55
 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1971) provides that "when a registrant .
	 files with the local
board a written request to reopen . . . [his] classification and the local board is of the
opinion that the information accompanying such request . . would not justify a change
in such . . . classification, it shall not reopen the registrant's classification."
a6 398 U.S. at 418.
67 7 U.S.C. § I35b(c) (1970).
65 439 F.2c1 at 593.
ao See "Deficiencies in Administration of Federal Insectidde, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act," H.R. Rep. No. 91-637, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
eo Id. at 16.
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reduced in an orderly, practical manner,' raised doubt as to the
safety of DDT sufficient to warrant immediate issuance of the can-
cellation notices.
One important consequence of the EDF decision is its requirement
that even discretionary decisions, such as the decision to suspend, will
henceforth have to be supported by reasoned opinions." Although the
courts" and the Administrative Procedure Act" have long required
agencies to articulate the reasons for their decisions in those instances
where the decision followed formal hearings, EDF in effect advocates
the application of a reasons requirement to informal agency decision
making. The court determined that such a requirement ensures that
the administrator will confine his decision-making within the statutory
limits of the discretion granted to him."
A recent Supreme Court decision has considered the related prob-
lem of requiring agency findings where the decision of the adminis-
trator has not been based on formal hearings. In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe," petitioners sought to enjoin the release
of federal funds for a project to construct a highway through a public
park in Memphis, Tennessee. They maintained that the decision of the
Secretary of Transportation approving the project was invalid without
accompanying formal findings to indicate whether his decision was
made in accordance with the standards for approval set forth in two
federal statutes." The Court rejected the request of Overton Park
Inc., and ruled that the absence of formal findings did not "necessarily
require" a remand of the case to the Secretary.08 The Court also de-
termined that it would be wasteful to remand for formal findings since
an administrative record had already been established, in the form of
affidavits filed by the Secretary, which indicated that his decision was
justified.°° Since the "bare" record alone may not provide sufficient
01 Statement of the Reasons Underlying the Decisions on Behalf of the Secretary
with Respect to the Registrations of Product Containing DDT, note 11 supra at 8.
02 439 F.2d at 598.
68 For a discussion of cases where reasons were required after formal hearings, see
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.12 (Supp. 1965).
04 5 U.S.C. § 557(a) (1970) provides that "[t] his section applies, according to the
provisions thereof, when a hearing is required to be conducted. . ." Section 557 (c)
provides that "[all decisions . . . shall include a statement of—(A) findings and con-
clusions, and the reasons or basis therefor. . ."
00 439 F.2d at 598.
60 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
87 The Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970), and
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970), both provide that "the
Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any
publicly owned land from a public park . . . unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such programs include all possible planning
to minimize harm to such park. . . ."
68 The Court stated that formal findings would be required "when the nature of
the agency action is ambiguous" or where the enabling statute specifically requires formal
findings to be made. 401 U.S. at 417.
69 Id. at 419.
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data to support an effective judicial review, the Court held that the
reviewing court may "require the administrative officials who partici-
pated in the decision to give testimony explaining their action."'"
This procedure would facilitate the process of determining whether
the officials acted within the scope of their authority and whether
their action was justifiable under the applicable standard." The Court
emphasized that this may be the only way of ensuring an adequate
review where the decision of the administrator under consideration is
not based on formal findings."
In EDF, the court objected to the summary fashion in which
the Secretary had treated the decision not to suspend DDT. The
Secretary had concluded that "scientific evidence . . . does not estab-
lish that the use of DDT constitutes an imminent hazard to human
health"" without enumerating the criteria upon which his decision
was based. The court ruled that it would be necessary for the Secre-
tary to establish "suspension criteria" so that the reviewing court can
determine whether the standards thus established conform to the legis-
lative purpose "to prevent an imminent hazard" to the public. 74 The
court concluded that judicial review will be enhanced when adminis-
trators "articulate the standards and principles that govern their
discretionary decisions."" Thus, both Overton Park and EDF propose
that, in situations where the absence of a formal decision-making
process would mean that administrative discretion would probably
go unchecked, some form of judicial restraint may be placed on the
exercise of that discretion for the purpose of effecting an adequate
judicial review.
It is concluded that EDF correctly decided, on the basis of statu-
tory construction and the relevant case law, that a denial of a request
for suspension constituted a final reviewable order under the FIFRA.
Once the decision not to suspend had been made by the Secretary of
Agriculture, the issue of whether DDT posed an imminent hazard to
the public was finally determined for purposes of review under the
FIFRA. In analyzing the finality concept, the court emphasized the
impact that the agency action would have upon the parties, rather
than viewing at what point in the administrative process the decision
had been made. The case law supports the pragmatic approach taken
by EDF. The court's decision to require the Secretary to issue a state-
ment of reasons for his decision not to suspend indicates an increasing
inclination on the part of courts to confine the broad exercise of agency
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 Id. at 598.
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discretion wherever possible. The decision in Overton Park supports
the conclusion in EDF that even seemingly unlimited discretion may
be restricted by the reviewing court so that an effective judicial review
may be made.
JOHN K. MARKEY
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